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Abstract
Smartphone based travel data collection has become an important tool for the analysis of trans-
portation systems. Interest in sharing travel survey data has gained popularity in recent years as
“Open Data Initiatives” by governments seek to allow the public to use these data, and hopefully
be able to contribute their findings and analysis to the public sphere. The public release of such
precise information, particularly location data such as place of residence, opens the risk of privacy
violation. At the same time, in order for such data to be useful, as much spatial resolution as pos-
sible is desirable for utility in transportation applications and travel demand modeling. This paper
evaluates geographic random perturbation methods (i.e. Geo-indistinguishability and the Donut
geomask) in protecting the privacy of respondents whose residential location may be published. We
measure the performance of location privacy methods, preservation of utility and randomness in
the distribution of perturbation distances with varying parameters. It is found that both methods
produce distributions of spatial perturbations that conform closely to common probability distri-
butions and as a result, that the original locations can be inferred with little information and a
high degree of precision. It is also found that while Achieved K-estimate anonymity increases lin-
early with desired anonymity for the Donut geomask, Geo-Indistinguishability is highly dependent
upon its privacy budget factor () and is not very effective at assuring desired Achieved K-estimate
anonymity.
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1 Introduction
Transportation demand modeling helps governments and researchers to better understand human
mobility in the delivery of an efficient, intelligent and secure transport system and is highly dependent
on quality travel demand data. Traditionally, travel demand surveys (Origin-Destination, regional,
household, etc.) actively engage respondents in the collection of travel and personal information. In
such contexts, collected data is available to relatively few institutions and individuals who are typically
employed and under contract not to use the data for any purposes apart from those strictly related
to their responsibilities (e.g. transportation planning). These institutions have also been responsible
for ensuring the protection of privacy when any of the data is provided to other institutions, or the
public, i.e. when the data are “published.”
Nowadays, there is a proliferation of pervasive devices and technologies (e.g. smartphones, tablets,
wearable devices, etc.), with location-sensing capabilities. Travel Surveys are now delivered on these
technologies that can collect personal and sensitive information (i.e. biographical data, credit card
information, location traces, etc.) passively even without respondents being aware. The mobility
of a respondent is typically recorded as trajectories and processed by location based services (e.g.
Google[Google, 2018], Uber[Uber, 2018b]), location-aware applications (e.g. Waze[Waze, 2018]) or
dedicated travel survey apps Patterson and Fitzsimmons [2017]). Whilst governments, public and
private transport researchers exploit the potential of passive large-scale transport data to understand
mobility patterns and travel demand, the threat of personal information disclosure cannot be over-
looked.
As witnessed in recent years, numerous high-profile privacy breaches have taken place. There
was, for example, an enormous public outcry around the privacy controversy related to Facebook
and Cambridge Analytica in 2018 [Solon, 2018]. Another example was provided by Anthony Tockar
[Neustar Research, 2018], a summer intern at Neustar (an information-analytics company) who showed
how to extract the exact location and time that celebrities used cabs in New York City based on
publicly available New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) data. By joining the two
data sets, Tockar was even able to find the cash tips paid by celebrities [Neustar Research, 2018] to
their drivers. These examples have given rise to an interest in data privacy violations and the need
for “data agents” Xu et al. [2014] (data collectors and analyst individuals or organizations) to protect
personally identifiable information.
At the same time, governments have been eager to adopt “Open Data Initiatives” that make
data available for free reuse and republishing to everyone, without restrictions related to copyright
or patents [Gurstein, 2011, Kitchin, 2014]. Open data agreements between governments, transport
operators and travel application developers have been witnessed in the sharing of information for
improving transportation service delivery. The City of Toronto in 2017 entered into an agreement
with Waze [Rider, 2017] to share and use its real-time traffic and road conditions data, to improve
service delivery and navigation in the city of Toronto. Uber also launched “Uber Movement” [Uber,
2018a] a platform that shares travel information with cities and transport planners with the aim of
helping them make informed decisions in the design of transport infrastructure.
Since there are no controls on who can access Open Data, any sensitive data provided by people
on whom data is collected i.e. “Data Owners” Xu et al. [2014], such as respondent identity needs to be
protected to prevent privacy breaches by untrusted users with malevolent intentions, or “adversaries.”
Geographic points of interest (POIs) can be extracted from trip data and inferences can be made
on characteristics (i.e. semantic data) such as religious affiliation, health conditions and political
interests of respondents. In line with this, the disclosure of sensitive location information poses a risk
and could violate a respondent‘s confidentiality if known to an adversary or untrusted party. Thus
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as governments adopt “Open Data” policies, it is important for the location privacy (or geoprivacy)
of a subject to be protected to ensure the identity of an individual is not disclosed through location
information.
Location protection mechanisms [Krumm, 2009] such as spatial cloaking, aggregation and random
perturbation are used to protect–what we refer to as–the Personally Identifiable Location Information
(PILI) of a subject Badu-Marfo et al.. Random perturbation techniques endeavor to deliver better
privacy, while maintaining spatial fidelity of data to maximize the utility of anonymized spatial data
[Kounadi and Leitner, 2015, Allshouse et al., 2010], while protecting privacy. Random perturbation
methods are used to add noise that displaces/masks point locations in a random distance and direc-
tion. A popular random perturbation method, geomasking, is used for preserving location privacy by
creating a circular buffer at a specified distance around the location to be masked, from which the
perturbed location is selected. Geomasking is the most common method of perturbing an individual‘s
location for privacy protectionAllshouse et al. [2010], Hampton et al. [2010]. However, the quantity
of displacement applied to a location for masking can at once reduce the utility of the data and,
if displacement is small, provide little privacy protection. Among the various random perturbation
techniques, two have received the greatest amount of attention and are the most commonly used in
practice.
The first, the “Donut Geomask”, which is an implementation of a k-anonymity location privacy
protection mechanism (LPPM) [Sweeney, 2002] and achieves privacy protection by using the underly-
ing neighborhood population density of a point location to determine the obfuscation distance. This
geomask technique has been used extensively in the protection of patient health information [Hampton
et al., 2010, Allshouse et al., 2010] and crime data [Kounadi and Leitner, 2015], both of which require
high spatial resolution in order to anonymize data.
The second, Geo-indistinguishability (Geo-I) [Andre´s et al., 2013], is an implementation of differ-
ential privacy for location data. It guarantees a respondent‘s location is protected within a specified
protection distance with a level of added noise that decreases with the distance, at a rate depending
on the desired level of privacy. In other words, the original location is highly indistinguishable from
locations that are close to it, and gradually becomes more distinguishable from locations that are
farther away [Chatzikokolakis et al., 2015]. This is intended to maintain anonymity, while at the same
time maintaining the utility of the underlying data.
In this paper, we have three main contributions. First, we apply the most common geographic
anonymization techniques to the case of residential location of respondents in a large-scale smart-
phone travel survey, MTL Trajet [Trajet, 2018]. Second, we evaluate both techniques with respect
to their ability to provide location privacy while maintaining utility of the data. Third, we analyze
the distribution of the perturbation distances for their degree of randomness to evaluate the degree to
which it would be possible to infer original location by an adversary with prior knowledge of only the
distribution of disturbances.
2 Problem Statement
The objective of this paper is to protect respondent residential locations collected in a travel survey
before data are published. We compare and evaluate the two most commonly used random perturba-
tion techniques (the Donut Geomask and Geo-I) to measure and their efficiency of privacy protection
and their effectiveness of data utility. We aim at evaluating the degree of protection offered by both
techniques by studying the probability distribution of the achieved perturbation distances.
To achieve this objective, we consider respondents who took part in the MTL Trajet smartphone
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survey of 2016. MTL Trajet respondents were asked to report their home location(latitude and
longitude) as part of the survey. We treat home locations as sensitive, independent points that need
to be protected to prevent violation by an adversary who has access to the published travel data.
(Note that these residential location data was never published by the City of Montreal.)
3 Literature Review
Extensive literature exists on the geographic perturbation of location addresses for privacy protection.
This research has been undertaken by numerous disciplines (e.g. computer science, geography, trans-
portation, etc.) that are engaged in dealing with personal identifiable location information (PILI). We
discuss a few examples of this in the following section.
Zhang et al. [Zhang et al., 2017] developed a geomasking technique referred to as location swap-
ping. Their technique replaces an original location with a masked location that is selected from all
possible locations with similar geographic characteristics within a specified neighborhood. Their tech-
nique provided greater anonymity than other random methods by achieving higher k values. (K is the
population around the sensitive location that could be associated with equal probability to the per-
turbed location. If K, were for example 10, then the perturbed location could be equally attributable
to 10 different households.)
Allhouse et. al. [Allshouse et al., 2010], used the Donut method to provide privacy for sensitive
health data using household data for Orange County, North Carolina. The authors determined the
actual k-anonymity (the number of households that could be associated with perturbed points) by
revealing household locations contained in the county database. They achieved an approximate privacy
standard for the households at 99.5% (i.e., 99.5% of perturbed points represented k-anonymities of
above a desired threshold).
Abul et al. [Abul et al., 2008], proposed a technique that creates cylinders within which users
move such that at every instant of time, there exists at least k users walking a given distance from
others.
Ma et al., [Ma and Chen, 2014] implemented Geo-I in protecting the privacy on nearby friend-
request location-based services (LBS for short) from stalkers. The authors combined the location
approximation technique and the homomorphic cryptography to achieve formal privacy guarantees for
LBS users, and achieved a satisfactory quality of the reported location to be used by the LBS. That is,
the query results were relevant to the original location of the user, even though only perturbed data
was provided to the LBS.
Finally, Chatzikokolakis et al. [Chatzikokolakis et al., 2015], protected the privacy of LBS users
using the principle of Geo-I. Using the foundations of Differential-Privacy, their work protected exact
user location, while providing sufficiently accurate location information to allow satisfactory results to
be provided by the LBS.
4 Background on Anonymization Techniques Considered
As described above, the two most widely used classes of anonymization techniques are k-Anonymity
and Differential-Privacy. This section describes them in greater detail.
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4.1 K-Anonymity
K-Anonymity is the most widely used class of privacy protection technique for location-based systems
existing in literature. The notion of k-anonymity was introduced by Sweeney in 2002 [Sweeney,
2002]. Many implementations of k-anonymity aim at protecting a subject‘s identity, requiring that
an adversary cannot identify an individual record, among a set of k indistinguishable subjects (i.e.
any query result in no less than k observations). k-Anonymity has been used in protecting location
(l-diversity), that requires that a set of k-points are spatially indistinguishable. This technique of
achieving location privacy using k-anonymity can be implemented through the use of dummy locations
[Cheng et al., 2006, Bamba et al., 2008], where k-1 dummy points are generated and returned as a
location-based query result [Bamba et al., 2008]. Another implementation to achieve k-anonymity in
location privacy is through the use of spatial cloaking [Gruteser and Grunwald, 2003]. This approach
creates a cloaking region around the real location point with k other points. The cloaking region is
then returned as the result of a location-based query and protects the original location by making it
indistinguishable among a set of k points in its cloaked region [Gruteser and Grunwald, 2003]. The first
technique we compare examines the random perturbation of sensitive locations using a new adaptive
geomasking technique, referred to as the Donut method which has the property of k-anonymity.
4.1.1 Donut Geomask
The Donut method is a geomask technique that protects the privacy of locations by transposing real
locations to random displacements within an inner circle radius (i.e. a minimum limit of perturbation)
and an outer circle radius that is the maximum limit of the perturbation distance. As illustrated in
Figure 1b, R1 is the inner circle representing the minimum displacement from the original location.
This method prevents negligible displacements that are close to the original location. On the other
hand, R2 is the outer circle which sets the maximum distance to of random displacement [Allshouse
et al., 2010]. Random displacements of perturbed points are inversely proportional to the underlying
population density, and this guarantees privacy protection of point locations while minimizing spatial
error [Zhang et al., 2017, Allshouse et al., 2010]. As an example, while point locations in urban
high-density communities will only need to be perturbed small distances, locations in low-density (e.g.
rural) areas will need to be perturbed larger distances to achieve the desired level of privacy. The
method provides a robust privacy guarantee as maximum and minimum thresholds of displacements
are used to prevent negligible or outlier perturbation distances.
4.2 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [Dwork, 2008] has gained popularity as a new privacy model for protecting an
individual without disclosing the data of a subject when the subject participates in a database, and
similar disclosure occurs with same probability when the subject does not participate in the database.
This ensures that the removal or addition of any record about an individual in a database does
not modify the results of a query. Intuitively, the concept of differential privacy requires that the
distribution of the characteristics of two datasets (i.e. the original dataset, D and adjacent dataset,
D‘) differing by only one observation should not be noticeable. This is explained by the notion that an
addition or removal of a single record in an adjacent dataset does not significantly affect the outcome
of a query to the two datasets.
It can be illustrated by a scenario where the probability of a query returning a value v when
applied to a database D is similar when compared to the probability of reporting the same value
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(a) Estimated k-Anonymity
(b) Donut geomask
(c) Varying protection distance, r
Figure 1: Examples of: (a) Calculating the estimated k-anonymity of a location. (b) Generating
protection distance by the Donut approach, and (c) Varying protection distances with Max K.
to an adjacent database D‘, differing by only one observation. The amount of difference between
D and D‘ is parameterized as epsilon (), or the “privacy budget.” In order to achieve differential
privacy, a controlled random noise is drawn from a Laplace distribution and added to a query output.
Differential privacy has been applied in the context of location privacy, as observed in [Ho and Ruan,
2011]. There a differentially private region quadtree is used for both de-noising the spatial domain
and identifying the likely geographic regions containing the sensitive locations. The quadtree spatial
decomposition enables one to obtain a localized, reduced sensitivity to achieve the differential privacy
goal and accurate outputs. The most recent form of this technique is Geo-indistinguishability [Andre´s
et al., 2013] and is the second technique we include in our comparison.
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4.2.1 Geo-indistinguishability
Geo-indistinguishability (Geo-I) is a property similar to that of differential privacy [Dwork, 2008].
This privacy model is an implementation of differential privacy to address location privacy protection.
Geo-I works with the notion that within a radius r > 0, a respondent is protected within r such
that the level of privacy is proportional to the radius. This is illustrated by a basic scenario where
a real location, li is obfuscated by using some random noise to an approximate location that lies in
radius r1 as shown in Figure 1c. At radius r1, a high level of privacy is achieved, making the real
location indistinguishable among the nearest point locations (there are 3). At radius r2 and r3, the
level of noise added to obfuscate li decreases at a rate that is dependent on the desired level of privacy,
“epsilon.” As an example, an adversary may be able to make a confident guess of the area where a
respondent is located, but would not be able to predict the exact location of a respondent within the
area [Chatzikokolakis et al., 2015]. The random noise of perturbation for Geo-I can be implemented
from a Laplacian distribution with respect to perturbation distance from original location. This
approach is intended to ensure robustness with respect to the composition of attacks, as the level
of privacy decreases in a controlled way (linearly) [Chatzikokolakis et al., 2015]. We implement an
experimental simulation that achieves Geo-I by perturbing home locations of respondents in the MTL
Trajet survey.
5 Definitions
In this section, we provide explicit definitions of technical concepts and key terms that will be used in
the analysis of the paper.
Sensitive location refers to any residential point locations represented in its Cartesian coordinates
as latitudes and longitudes that needs to be protected to prevent the identification of a user.
k-anonymity refers to the population within a buffer region of the outer radius around the original
point prior to displacement, from which a de-identified cluster case cannot be reversely identified. K
is the population around a sensitive location that could be associated with equal probability to a per-
turbed location. If K, were for example 10, then the perturbed location could be equally attributable
to 10 different households.
Protection Radius refers to a circular region around a sensitive location within which other
location points existing should be made indistinguishable from the sensitive point.
Location-privacy protection mechanism. These are mechanisms that modify datasets to offer
privacy guarantees by adding a level of noise to displace the sensitive location to distances away from
their true location. Protected datasets are also referred to as geomasked datasets.
Adversary. This is an agent seeking to re-identify true residential location of the user by inferring
from sanitized dataset.
6 Methodology
We assume a sensitive residential location, Lr of a respondent that needs to be protected by adding a
random noise to displace the original location to a new location. We refer to the “noised” location as
the ”Perturbed Location” of the respondent. The distance and direction to which a sensitive location is
displaced to guarantee protection is implemented by a location-privacy protection mechanism (LPPM).
In this paper, we employ two LPPMs namely GeoI and Donut.
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A protection radius, r, is a required parameter for perturbation by both mechanisms and this sets
the minimum distance to which a sensitive location will remain indistinguishable among a set of other
locations nearby. As illustrated in Figure 1b, the Donut geomask method defines its protection radius
as R1, which is the minimum distance a sensitive location is displaced to ensure indistinguishability
among a set of k points, referred to as ”k-Anonymity”. For the GeoI, the protection radius is the
defined circular region around a sensitive location to which other locations within the radius are made
indistinguishable by adding a level of noise. We employ a numerical set including 100, 200, 300, 400,
500 as the protection radius (or Max K) for both mechanisms. E.g. 100 is the radius required (the
Max K) to ensure indistinguishability with 99 other locations, 200 is the radius required for 199 other
locations, etc.
For the Donut geomask, an outer radius R2 is also defined to be the maximum distance that a
sensitive location can be displaced. This limits the extent of perturbation for the Donut method.
We experiment by varying predefined k-anonymity levels in calculating sets of outer radii for each
point as shown in Figure 1c. This allows us to experiment with how different perturbation radius
sizes affect the output of desired anonymity results (i.e. the Achieved K-estimate). We undertake
the Donut perturbation method of selecting random distance and angles within R1 and R2 using a
random number generator built into the perturbation algorithm 8. The distortion of the perturbation
is guided by the region boundary such that a new geomask point does not fall outside the region of
the original location. Using the desired k-anonymity level and population density, the outer radius
R2 is calculated and inner radius, R1, is estimated as 10% of R2 in this paper. The outer radius,
R2 varies from point to point since it depends on population density. As an example, for low density
regions points are displaced at farther distances than in high density areas.
For the Geo-I technique, we maintain the sets of outer radii R2 for the varying k-anonymity levels
as the protection distance within which perturbation should occur. We undertake this approach to
examine how a changing width of the perturbation region will affect the results of the geomasked
points. To determine the sensitivity of the privacy budget epsilon, we employ varying privacy budget
values (0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40, 0.50) that are repeated for each protection distance. This range is typical
of what is used in the literature.
We compare the protection levels achieved from both techniques using the Achieved K and Average
error distance metrics. We then calculate the Euclidean distances between the original and geomasked
points and summarize them in histograms to which we fit the following probability distributions (nor-
mal, lognormal, gamma, exponential, Weibull). Since there is a trade-off between privacy protection
and the utility (or usefulness) of the perturbed data, we also evaluate the utility of the perturbed
points. To do this, we use average spatial error (defined below).
7 Evaluation Metrics
In this section, we present a set of metrics that we use in evaluating the effectiveness of the perturbation
techniques used to protect true respondent residential location. We discuss the evaluation metrics
under three main indicators: distribution of perturbation, location privacy and data utility. We
discuss each of the metrics, the steps involved in its execution and the desired output of measure
below.
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7.1 Location Perturbation Distribution
To understand the effectiveness of the perturbation techniques used in this paper, we study the ran-
domness in displacement for each perturbed point by calculating the euclidean distances between the
original points and the obfuscated points for each technique. We refer to this as “perturbed distance.”
The perturbed distances are tested for randomness of distribution by fitting five continuous distri-
butions (Normal, Lognormal, Gamma, Weibull and Exponential), to assess if they follow a known
distribution pattern. We consider perturbed distances that follow particular distributions as lack-
ing randomness and showing weak privacy since, as shown by Farooq et al. [Farooq et al., 2013]
an adversary could reversely identity a subject‘s residential location knowing only the parameters
of the distribution. Distances which do not fit any distribution are considered to be strong against
re-identification by an adversary. The fitted log likelihood values of the different distributions are
presented to compare which distributions have the best fit.
7.2 Location privacy
In order to ensure a reliable guarantee of protection of a respondent‘s location, we measure the success
of privacy achieved in obfuscating such locations using two approaches: the achieved K-estimate and
geographic distance. The first metric, Achieved K-estimate is a commonly used measure of privacy
protection performance Hampton et al. [2010]. It is inspired from k-Anonymity Sweeney [2002] and
evaluates the accuracy of location privacy by measuring the number of households among whom a
specific de-identified subject cannot be reversely identified Cassa et al. [2006], Allshouse et al. [2010].
This is illustrated by the population of households that can be counted within a circular region with
its radius defined by the euclidean distance from original location to its obfuscated location as shown
in Figure 1a.
The estimated k-anonymity for a sensitive location is calculated as:
kest,i = pi ×D2i ×
(
Ni
Ai
)
where D i is the measure of Euclidean distance between the original household location and its
perturbed location, N i is the population of the neighborhood block and Ai is the area of the geographic
block of the neighborhood. The estimated k-anonymity metric replaces the exact location of a subject
with an anonymized spatial region that contains at least K-1 other subjects preventing an adversary
from distinguishing a unique subject at a probability of 1/K Ghinita et al. [2010]. Achieving higher
Achieved K-estimate values guarantees a higher degree of privacy protection. In our analysis, we
compare the derived Achieved K-estimate for each perturbed location and evaluate which perturbation
technique provides the highest location privacy protection across a range of protection radii and varying
privacy budgets. We consider a minimum of ten households to be the smallest to ensure privacy
protection.
In our second approach, we use the geographic distance metric which evaluates the guarantee of
privacy protection by the extent of perturbed distance. In using the euclidean distance between the
original and perturbed location, we assume a small geographic distance offers a low level of privacy
with weak protection guarantees, whereas for a stronger privacy guarantee, requires higher geographic
distances.
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7.3 Data Utility
Discussions on privacy protection generally assume a trade-off between privacy and the usefulness of
data after perturbation. In other words, when a higher privacy is achieved, the potential usefulness
of the data is degraded especially in a transportation planning context. Consider an example where
our application interest is transit assignment for metro users, and that we have information on a
respondent‘s home location that we would like to protect/perturb. The greater the perturbation
distance to the home location, the more likely the perturbation is to protect the respondent‘s identity.
At the same time, the greater the perturbation distance, the more likely it will be that the respondent
would be assigned to the wrong metro access station and therefore anonymized assignment results
would not correspond with the original results. As such, we assess the utility of anonymized data for
the purpose of travel modeling by comparing the amount of spatial error introduced by the perturbation
techniques. In our analysis, a minimum observed average spatial error defines a high utility of sanitized
data. We calculated the average spatial error as:
ASE =
1
n
×
n∑
i=1
Di,j
where n is the total number of point locations, D ij is the euclidean distance from original location,
i, to perturbed location, j.
8 Experimental Setup
For this analysis, we used training datasets as discussed in the section below. We built on algorithms
and source codes that had been developed for both perturbation methods. For Geo-I, we enhanced the
differential privacy algorithm which is implemented by Chatzikokolakis et al. [Chatzikokolakis et al.,
2015] in the Location Guard browser extension [Bordenabe, 2014]. Our enhancement provided capabil-
ities for varying epsilon and choosing an attribute field to derive protection distances of perturbation.
The algorithm was deployed on Quantum GIS 2.18 [Quantum, 2013] running on Microsoft Windows 10
desktop computer. On the other hand, we used and improved existing algorithms for the Donut Geo-
mask, which is built by the Bayesian Maximum Entropy Lab of the University of North Carolina [Serre,
2018]. Our modification updated the libraries for the algorithm to be deployed on the Esri ArcGIS 10.4
platform. The complete source code is available at http://github.com/gbmarfo/geoperturbation.
9 Experimental Results and Analysis
9.1 Training Datasets
We conducted analysis on both perturbation methods (i.e. Donut and Geo-I) using the MTL Trajet
data of 2016. MTL Trajet 2016 was a large-scale smartphone travel survey conducted by the City
of Montreal using the app MTL Trajet developed by the Concordia University TRIP Lab. The
study took place in October and November 2016 [Patterson, 2017]. The residential location data
used in the analysis came from the questionnaire asked to respondents after installation of the app.
Altogether, the home locations of 7,985 respondents were included in the analysis. Whereas the data
sets contain trajectory information of trips by users that we could infer sensitive origin destinations,
we focused on working with the user‘s reported data that had been definitively labelled as place of
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residence. Notwithstanding, the techniques and algorithms are applicable to sensitive trip origins and
destinations as well.
9.2 Analysis on Privacy Protection
In measuring the amount of privacy protection achieved, we calculated the Achieved K-estimate for
perturbed points over varying protection distances for values as shown in Figure 1c, and evaluated the
population that made them indistinguishable if reversely identified by an adversary. This is illustrated
in Figure 1a. We experimented with varying protection distances to measure the relationship between
privacy and perturbation distances. Our analysis on achieved privacy protection is categorized and
discussed as follows.
9.2.1 Achieved K-estimate Measurement
We observe for the Donut approach, that the estimate of Achieved K-estimate increases linearly
with an increase in protection distance. Thus, higher Achieved K-estimate values are obtained when
perturbation distances increase. A higher Achieved K-estimate value guarantees a stronger privacy as
a larger indistinguishable population is created around the perturbed point [Zhang et al., 2017] (see
Section 6).
Figure 2: A plot of the Achieved K-estimate showing average k achieved vs average radius at Max K
(see Section 6.). The diagram shows (a) Achieved K for the Donut method and (b) Achieved K for
the Geo-I method.
The Donut approach using an inner ring radius, R1 as shown in Figure 1b, sets the minimum
distance of perturbation to prevent perturbation of too small distances. As can be seen this has the
effect of ensuring relatively high Achieved K measures that increases linearly with Max K. On the
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other hand, the Geo-I approach did not guarantee stronger privacy protection over widened protection
distances in our analysis. Unlike the Donut approach where Achieved K-estimate values increase lin-
early with perturbation distances, the Geo-I approach provides privacy that correlates to a minimized
privacy budget (i.e. epsilon). As shown in Figure 2, the lowest Achieved K estimates (0 to 5) was
recorded for epsilons at 0.3 to 0.5 whereas a steep rise to 25 was observed for epsilon at 0.1 which
suggest an improved privacy with smaller privacy budgets.
Figure 3: A plot of Average Achieved K against perturbation distances.
Our continued analysis incrementing protection distances (with larger Max K) for Geo-I did not
impact on Achieved K-estimates whereas the Donut method steadily increased with distances. Our
analysis ended with a minimum privacy budget of 0.1 which performed the best of the chosen privacy
budget values. Lowering the privacy budget improves privacy protection [Primault et al., 2014, Oya
et al., 2017]. The absence of an inner ring in the Geo-I, however, allowed for the negligible distances
of perturbation resulting in weak levels of privacy. As such, when considering all levels of Max K and
epsilon, the Donut method performed better in the delivery of privacy protection over the Geo-I.
9.2.2 Average K-estimate and Perturbation Distance
We use the optimal performing parameters for Donut at Max K of 500 and Geo-I with Max K of
500 and a privacy budget of 0.1, to evaluate the correlation of perturbation distances and Achieved
K-estimates. We break Achieved K-estimates into bins of 10 and aggregate the mean perturbation
distances with both techniques. Geo-I records its maximum Achieved K-estimate at 112 and its highest
perturbation distance at 87 meters as shown in Figure 3. Notice that despite choosing a K-Max value
of 500, the Geo-I technique never produced Achieved K-estimate values near 500. At its lowest end, an
Achieved K-estimate of 0 is recorded with an average distance of about 10 meters. This denotes very
weak privacy protection as negligible distances are observed with an Achieved K-estimate of less than
10, i.e. the locations are highly distinguishable. The Donut method on the other had never produces
Achieved K-estimates of less than 10 and results in perturbation distances from 60 to 200 meters. In
other words, the Donut does a much better job of ensuring privacy.
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9.3 Analysis of Perturbed Distance Distribution
As mentioned before, each perturbation technique seeks to protect a respondent‘s location by trans-
posing to a random distance away from its original location. We studied the distribution of perturbed
distances to evaluate whether these distances conformed to known probability distributions. If they
do, then the original locations can be inferred with knowledge only of the probability distribution and
its parameters (see Farooq et al. [2013] for details).
(a) Geo-I (b) Donut
Figure 4: The plot of density distributions of spatial distortions for both methods.
To do this, we first calculated the euclidean distances between the original location and its gener-
ated obfuscated location for each perturbation method. In order to evaluate whether the distributions
conformed to known distributions, we fit common continuous distributions (i.e. Normal, Lognormal,
Weibull, Gamma, Exponential) using maximum likelihood estimation to the perturbed distance distri-
butions. We also recorded the maximum log-likelihood values for each of the distributions for different
values of K-Max and epsilon for distances achieved by both the Donut and Geo-I methods. The
lognormal distribution recorded the highest maximum log likehood values for both techniques. The
distribution has its greatest density centered about the mode value, where the mode value represents
a positive linear skew. We illustrate the empirical anonymization distributions of spatial distortions
observed for both perturbation methods as shown in Figures 5 and 6. The distribution of randomness
in the spatial error fits better in a lognormal distribution as shown in the plots.
In order to attest that the randomness of perturbation distances generated by the two approaches
are closest to a lognormal distribution, we report the average maximum log likelihood statistics of the
distributions of fit to the anonymized data sets for both techniques.
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Figure 5: Log Likelihood plots for continuous distributions on Geo-I
Table 1: A table showing average maximum likelihood values of continuous distributions fitted on
anonymized data for perturbation methods.
Method Normal Exponential Weibull Gamma Lognormal
Donut -48464.978 -44003.698 -43495.976 -42671.105 -41333.105
Geo-I -32442.575 -26170.354 -26144.260 -26002.949 -25521.902
9.4 Analysis of Data Utility
Finally, we calculate the average spatial error for sets of perturbation distances achieved by varying
K Max (i.e. 100, 200, 300, 400, 500) and epsilon. As shown in Figure 7, the Donut method shows a
steady increase in the spatial error with an increase in Max-K. The magnitude of spatial error degrades
the utility of the anonymized data, however. This implies that to ensure a high utility of anonymity
for the Donut approach, the protection distance should be reduced so as to ensure privacy protection,
while maintaining the utility of the perturbed data.
The Geo-I method exhibits a high utility on anonymized data as average spatial error decreases
gradually with an increase in the privacy budget as shown in Figure 7. A high average spatial error was
observed at an estimate of 35 meters for the smallest value of epsilon (i.e. 0.1) to a mean protection
distance of K Max at 500. Meanwhile, at a high epsilon of 0.5 applying the mean of the same K
Max values, an estimate of average spatial error of only about 10 meters was observed. With this
observation, the Geo-I provides a high utility relative to the Donut approach, but clearly limited
privacy protection.
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Figure 6: Log Likelihood plots for continuous distributions on Donut
10 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have evaluated two popular geographic perturbation techniques (Geo-indistinguishability
and Donut Geomask) to anonymize residential location data from a large-scale smartphone travel sur-
vey. Our results showed that the Donut method performs better for anonymizing location data than
the Geo-I method. The degree of privacy resulting from the Donut method increased linearly with an
increase of the protection distance thereby making the method sensitive to desired K-anonymity lev-
els. The inner radius used for the Donut method that determines a minimum distance of perturbation
provides a great improvement to output perturbation. As observed in our analysis, the inner radius
prevented negligible perturbed distances thus this technique guarantees a strong privacy protection of
sensitive locations.
On the other hand, Geo-I, which has drawn a lot of attention recently, showed much worse privacy,
but did however show promise for preserving the utility of the data. Unlike the Donut method, Geo-
I is not sensitive to increased protection distance, but rather to lower privacy budget (i.e. epsilon)
values. This was evident in our analysis, where we experimented with a range of epsilon values. At the
smallest epsilon value of 0.1, we achieved the best perturbation distance for the Geo-I at an average of
25 meters. As explained by Oya et al. [Oya et al., 2017], the poor performance of Geo-I is attributed
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Figure 7: Spatial Error observed for Donut (left graph) and Geo-I method (right graph)
to the fact that counting queries in differential privacy has low sensitivity. This means that an addition
or removal of a single record does not significantly affect the outcome of a query thereby ensuring high
privacy achievement without introducing much noise. On the contrary, queries implemented in Geo-I
demonstrate high sensitivity and therefore require large noise to achieve a high level of privacy.
Notwithstanding, while analyzing the distribution of perturbed distances, we observed that the
distances of perturbation closely resembled lognormal distributions for both approaches. This means
that true randomness in the resulting displacements from perturbation is not achieved. With this in
mind, an adversary with prior knowledge of the perturbation distance distributions would be able to
reversely identify a real location from its perturbed point within a high degree of precision.
We find interest in advancing our research into improving the protection efficiency of Geo-I by
introducing the concept of inner radius as implemented in the Donut method. A potential solution
to improve Geo-I privacy performance which we seek to investigate, is to design its location queries
to have lower sensitivity. Further investigation of Geo-I using smaller protection budgets might also
prove fruitful. Also, for the Donut method, we would like to work on incorporating location semantics
in determining the optimal radius of perturbation as an addition to the existing computation by
population density.
We also acknowledge the scope of this work is focused on the anonymization of independent point
samples and that there is also a potential interest for protecting privacy in the context of multi-point
data such as trajectories. We hope to further our research into location-privacy protection mechanisms
that address multiple trips points and trajectories of mobile users in the future.
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